Plane Lands on 101

hermasceifus, how do you know there wasn't a gas leak?

Maybe there's a reason they actually investigate such things, rather than jumping to conclusions.

C'mon, admit it. Weren't you just praying that the Smitty's Towing driver would just floor it while Captain Sullied was standing on the tow chain??

This town has been more fun than a barrel of monkeys lately.

Could undetectable water in the fuel tank of the Piper PA-24 be responsible for this crash? Does the pre-flight procedure the pilot performs work as certified? How many decades and how many deaths before the NTSB does its job? Whether undetectable water in the fuel was the cause of this crash or not the indicated design flaw still exists. Should the aircraft be repaired a heads up about an indicated design flaw is in order.

Here is the evidence about undetectable water in the fuel tanks of the affected aircraft. Note that the evidence is from NTSB and FAA documentation.

Number one: Letter to NTSB and FAA dated June 20, 1985

http://www.sumpthis.com/hwdocs/doc5.htm

Number two: NTSB Safety Recommendation A-83-6 dated January 13, 1986,

http://sumpthis.com/ntsbrecommendatio...

Number three: FAA Safety Recommendations 99.283 and 99.284 dated May 24, 2000.

http://sumpthis.com/05242000faaletter...

The documentation above clearly demonstrates that a life taking indicated design flaw has gone on for over twenty four years.
When will the NTSB "go team" finally arrive?

sumpthiscom & Rich, thanks for the ONLY responsible comments so far! I appreciate people who actually think before commenting :)

Ahem...the southbound freeway was closed to zero lanes. I was on the fwy at that time and, although I did not witness the landing, did experience an excrutiating 1-hour wait, sitting in traffic from Fairview to Patterson. Traffic was diverted off at Patterson by the CHP. Despite the fact that I missed a colleague's wedding shower, it's miraculous that no one was seriously hurt or worse. I say "viva la" investiation! This was a life threatening situation and an investigation is in order.

What do you bet sumpthis.com has a kit he wants to sell...

"The documentation above clearly demonstrates that a life taking indicated design flaw has gone on for over twenty four years. "

No, it doesn't clearly indicate anything of the sort The FAA issued an AD to fix a particular problem and the incidence of follow on problems were minimal for those aircraft in complience.

The real problem is operator error in not following refuel procedures and faulty maintenance of the filler caps which induce the water to begin with.

Occam would suggest when an engine quits one mile from the airport, the reason is because it ran out of gas due to poor planning. If there was a water problem it would have occured shortly after take off...save your money, investigation closed.

sa1 here is what the NTSB said:

"NTSB LTR DTD: 1/10/85

Although the Airworthiness Directive issued by the FAA requires the installation of additional quick drains, we are uncertain as to the effectiveness of this requirement as the sole "fix." If wrinkles are present after the completion of the Airworthiness Directive or redevelop during service usage, water again will be entrapped. The Safety Board believes that few pilots will go through the procedure of bringing the tail of the aircraft within 5 inches of the ground and then rocking the wings 10 inches up and down. If the pilot does not rock the wings high enough and for a sufficient period, water will remain in the system or accumulate beyond the capacity of the fuel strainer. The Safety Board reiterates that a means for positive detection and/or elimination of water should be a required modification for the affected airplanes. Compliance with this Safety Recommendation through distinct design modifications would provide a definitive long-term solution to the problem of Cessna fuel-bladder water entrapment. Safety Recommendation A-83-6 has been classified as "Open--Unacceptable Action" pending further response."

sa1 here is what the NTSB further said:

"NTSB LTR DTD: 9/6/85

As indicated in our letter of January 10, 1985, we believe that AD 84-10-01 does not
provide an adequate and reliable means for the positive detection and elimination of
water in the fuel. Some maintenance personnel who have carried out the provisions
of the AD have expressed grave doubt as to its effectiveness. More importantly,
these doubts appear to have been substantiated by the continued occurrence of water
in fuel accidents such as those at Basille, Louisiana, on November 22, 1984,
involving a Cessna 182 (Nl857X); at Elmonte, California, on January 5, 1985,
involving a Cessna 182 (N58816); and at Cold Foot, Alaska, on July 19, 1984,
involving a Cessna U-206 (N39486).

While AD 84-10-01 may provide partial alleviation of the water-in-fuel problem,
installation of a water separator and a quick drain at the low points of the fuel
system also should be required in airplanes affected by this AD. Such a water
separator, available for installation on Cessna Model 180 and 182 airplanes, already
has been certified by the FAA through issuance of Supplemental Type Certificate
(STC) SA-2628NM.

We believe that a requirement for the installation of a water separator in the many
thousands of Cessna airplanes covered by AD 84-10-01 to be logical, feasible and
acceptable, and we urge the FAA to reconsider the full implementation of this
recommendation. Pending the FAA's further response, Safety Recommendation A-83-6
remains classified in an "Open--Unacceptable Action" status.

NTSB LTR DTD: 3/25/86

The Safety Board remains concerned that Airworthiness Directive (AD) 84-10-01 may
not be completely effective in preventing water from entering the fuel system. In
fact, one member of the Safety Board staff found a significant amount of water in
the fuel tanks of his Cessna airplane shortly after complying with the AD. While AD
84-10-01 may help to reduce the entrapment of water within the fuel tanks, it does
not provide for the positive detection and/or elimination of water from the fuel.
Additionally, as the aircraft that have complied with the AD have recently had their
fuel tanks completely "purged" and fuel caps resealed, it is expected that it may be
some time before the problem redevelops.

The Safety Board concludes that an impasse has been reached in our efforts to
convince the FAA that further attention is needed to assure the elimination of water
form the fuel tanks of the affected airplanes. As we have no further information to
offer in defense of this recommendation, Safety Recommendation A-83-6 has been
classified as "Closed--Unacceptable Action." Although we have closed this
recommendation our concern for this safety issue has not diminished and we will
continue to voice our concerns in future pertinent accident investigations.

The NTSB has not looked back and the indicated design flaw still exists. "

sa1

I have nothing to sell.
My website is non-commercial research only.
The sole purpose of my website is to save lives.

Only an idot would compare an apple to a grapefruit or a cessna to piper. I own a PA24 piper comanche it happens to be the same year as this one. I have never had a water in fuel problem (hope I never do) but this A D is not for a piper its for a cessna. Yes the piper has a fuel blatter but after traveling from temecula to SBA the blatter was full of air not water.

Only a fanboy would distiguish two light GAs as different as apples and grapefruits...to me they're just fruits, like many of their owners.

The manufacturer and the certificating authority (FAA) had studied the problem, issued a fix and got on with business. The NTSB throws a hissy fit just like OSHA and AQMD because that is how they justify their jobs...not because they're right.

If a pilot is operating in an enviroment where water contamination is a problem, then let them buy the STC kit and feel better about it.

"Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous but like the sea, is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect."

words I live by...

I would think that anyone with an airman's certificate would be the very last one's to pop off with such conclusions like this.

How would you feel if you and an engine out and had to put down, only to have quarterbacker's talk smack about you before the investigation is completed?

My goodness, have the decency to wait until you read "The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows: " Then you can engage in hangar talk.

It could be you next!

Oh puh-leeeze. If he's any kind of real pilot, he's probably at the E-Bar right now proclaiming any landing you walk away from was a good one!

If you own a Piper PA-24 try pouring 16 ounces of red dyed water into the fuel tank. Go to the sump drain and let me know if you can positively detect it and then eliminate the same 16 ounces of red dyed water you just poured into the fuel tank.

20 June 1985



An open letter to:







1. The Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board



2. The Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration







Within the past several years our attention has been focused on unexplained engine failures in general aviation aircraft accidents. In researching some of these accidents, certain differences and similarities began to emerge. Some of the similarities now clearly indicate that water ingestion through the regular fuel system was the cause of many engine failures. This was surprising since the CAR's and FAR's under which these aircraft were certified provide for the positive removal of water from the fuel system before flight. Obviously, something is wrong.







A series of tests on some of these fuel systems was undertaken. Aircraft were tested in the field under real world conditions to determine how much water would be retained in the tanks after compliance with the manufacturers recommended methods of draining the system before flight. To date no aircraft has met the requirements of the regulations for fuel system design. All aircraft tested fail to meet the drain requirements of CAR 3.553, CAR 3.444 (c), FAR 23.971 (b), or FAR 23.999. Some fail to meet the venting, draining of compartments, and isolation requirements as well.







Aircraft tested to date are:

Cessna 177
Cessna 206
Cessna U206
Cessna T207
Cessna 182
PA-24-250
PA-23-150

In all cases excess water was retained in the tanks after intentional introduction of water into the tanks through the regular filler neck. The water was dyed for easier sighting and positive collection before introduction. In one case, as much as a gallon of water remained in the aircraft tanks after compliance with the Owner's Manual procedures for pre-flight. In all cases extraordinary methods for removal did not find and purge all the water from the systems.







Several 210 aircraft of varying vintages have been examined, post crash, and were found to have had water in excess amounts in the fuel system prior to the crash. This applies to those aircraft with integral tanks as well as those equipped with bladder tanks

Here is the rest of the letter to the NTSB and FAA.

Further field testing of general aviation aircraft for water retention is planned. Past tests were recorded on TV tape and are available if desired. All future tests will also be adequately recorded to properly document this work.

As a result of these tests and the continued loss of life in unexplained aircraft accidents in general aviation, it is recommended that a one time water retention test be conducted on all general aviation aircraft and that those failing to meet the requirements of current or past regulations under which they were certified be grounded until those requirements can be met by demonstration.

It is recognized that this recommendation is harsh in that many aircraft may not meet the requirements. However, engine failures, many unexplained, are the greatest cause of fatal accidents in the Cessna 210 series of aircraft. The same may prove true of other types if a thorough analysis of all fatal accidents was undertaken.

In the past, techniques for determining water contamination as the cause of engine stoppage were yet to be refined. Today those techniques are available and should be used in all investigations where otherwise unexplained power loss or engine stoppage occurs.

Research is underway to demonstrate the effects of water in reciprocating engines so that good investigative procedures may be employed in the future. Current information concerning water ingestion will gladly be shared with both the NTSB and the FAA if desired. Assistance in further refining these investigative techniques would be welcomed.

In the interest of saving life and property, and improving the safety of general aviation, it is again recommended that proof of proper certification be demonstrated in-so-far as fuel systems are concerned in all general aviation aircraft. Proof should consist of a demonstrated ability to find and eliminate all water in the fuel system by reasonable pre-flight procedures performed by pilots:..not mechanics.

The courtesy of a reply concerning the intentions of both the NTSB and the FAA in this regard is requested. Such a reply will certainly aid in the planning and execution of future tests and research.

Respectfully,

Norman L. Horton

Jerry L. Wells

NTSB respond to Norman Horton and Jerry Wells

National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, D.C. 20594

September 3, 1985

Messrs. Norman L. Horton and Jerry L. Wells
Aviation Safety and Management Consultants
4582 Old Stage Road
Central Point, Oregon 97502







Gentlemen:







Thank you for your letter of June 20, 1985, regarding engine failures in general aviation airplanes due to water in the fuel.

As you know, during the past several years, the National Transportation Safety Board's concern regarding accidents involving water in the fuel has resulted in the issuance of a number of related recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) which affect many thousands of airplanes. These include Safety Recommendations A-80-5 through -7 (information regarding detection and elimination of water from aircraft fuel systems and the inclusion of supplemental information in Pilot Operating Handbooks); A-81-9 through -11 (specifications and design criteria for airport aviation fuel storage and dispensing systems); A-83-66 (Maule auxiliary fuel tanks); A-83-3 through -11 (a comprehensive evaluation of aircraft fuel systems including fuel bladders, fuel caps, seals and leakage, fuel quick drains, fuel strainers, water collectors, and related Airworthiness Directives affecting large numbers of Cessna and Piper airplanes); A-84-104 through -107 (Cessna fuel reservoir tanks, Pilot Operating Handbooks and Manuals); and A-85-8 through -10 (Mooney fuel tanks, inspection and maintenance of fuel filler cap/adapter assemblies, leak testing procedures). Additionally, a number of airplanes you have tested regarding water-in-fuel problems, i.e., Cessna Models 206, U206, T207, and 182, have been addressed directly in Safety Recommendations A-83-3 through -7; the fuel preflight and drainage provisions of Piper Apache Models PA-23-150, -160, and -235 are currently being evaluated. Copies of the above-cited safety recommendations are enclosed for your information.

Prior to the issuance of these recommendations, the subject of water in the fuel had not received adequate attention from either the FAA or the manufacturers. However, that situation has changed significantly, and a number of substantial remedial actions have already been taken. Moreover, there is a new perspective and concern regarding water in the fuel, and directed probes such as those referenced in your letter continue to disclose problems which merit further attention.

NTSB further respond to Norton and Wells

The fuel system test results referenced in your letter indicating that a number of airplanes may not comply with applicable fuel system certification requirements has been an area of concern to the Safety Board for some time. The Board has advised the FAA of similar deficiencies in several of its safety recommendations; e.g., Safety Recommendations A-83-3 through -7 regarding Cessna airplanes that have flexible, rubberized bladder-type fuel cells in their wings. More importantly, the Board's evaluation of such fuel cells also disclosed that the deficiencies noted could be effectively resolved. For example, the Safety Board in Safety Recommendation A-83-6 recommended that the FAA:

Require a fuel system modification to Cessna single-engine airplanes with rubberized bladder-type fuel cells which will provide a means for positive detection and/or elimination of water from the fuel, such as an increased capacity fuel strainer or a separate water collector system and quick drains at the low point of the fuel system.

The FAA, in response to this and other Safety Board recommendations regarding Cessna bladder-type fuel systems, issued Airworthiness Directive (AD) 84-10-01. However, the Safety Board believes that the AD does not provide an adequate, reliable means for positive detection and/or elimination of water in the fuel. Some maintenance personnel who have carried out the provisions of the AD have expressed serious doubt as to its effectiveness. As more airplanes comply with the AD, there is increasing evidence to substantiate this belief; i.e, the continued occurrence of water-in-fuel accidents despite AD compliance such as those at Basile, Louisiana, on November 22, 1984, involving a Cessna 182 (N1857X); at Elmonte, California, on January 5, 1985, involving a Cessna 182 (N58816); and at Cold Foot, Alaska; on July 19, 1984, involving a Cessna U-206 (N3948G).

NTSB end of letter response to Norman Horton and Jerry Wells

While AD 84-10-01 may partly alleviate the water-in-fuel problem, we believe that installation of a water separator (increased capacity fuel strainer) and quick drains at the low point of the fuel system should be required in airplanes affected by this AD. Such a water separator, available for installation on Cessna Model 180 and 182 airplanes, has already been certificated by the FAA through issuance of Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA-2628NM. The water storage/collection capacity of the separator (1 qt) is not likely to be exceeded, particularly in cases where AD 84-10-01 has already been complied with. In fact, compliance with AD 84-10-01 or an equivalent procedure might be considered a desirable prerequisite to such an installation. Therefore, an additional requirement by the FAA to have water separators installed would be logical, feasible and acceptable. The Safety Board will continue its efforts to persuade the FAA to take such positive action to address the water-in-fuel safety problem evident in the Cessna model airplanes.

Further, the number of fuel system deficiencies discovered by the Safety Board in recent years would seem to support a continued, selective testing of fuel systems of all general aviation airplanes. In fact, the Safety Board believes that the implementation of actions such as those proposed in safety Recommendation A-83-6 regarding Cessna airplanes and the related, continuing development of water separators/collectors, etc., might be applicable and effective in connection with existing fuel system deficiencies in other makes and models of airplanes. Therefore, while problems with general aviation fuel systems merit concern and further remedial action needs to be taken by both the FAA and the manufacturers, the Safety Board remains optimistic regarding the ultimate resolution of these fuel system problems. However, the Safety Board, unlike the FAA, is primarily an investigative agency and has no direct authority regarding aircraft certification. Therefore, the Safety Board's evaluation of fuel system deficiencies is derived largely from its accident/incident investigations and/or analysis of accident data.

The Safety Board is most appreciative of the time and effort you have expended toward improvement of general aviation fuel system safety. The Board would be pleased to evaluate any information you may wish to share with us regarding existing water-in-fuel problems, new investigative techniques regarding this subject, or development/testing of fuel system water separators. Therefore, I have asked Mr. Paul Alexander of the Safety Board's Bureau of Technology (telephone No. (202) 382-6654) to meet with you for further discussion of this matter.

Enclosures
Respectfully yours,

Jim Burnett
Chairman

Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration

Central Region
Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office
1075 Inner Loop Road
College Park, Georgia 30337

OCT 9 1985

Mr. Don Trompler
Piper Aircraft Corporation
2926 Piper Drive
Vero Beach, Florida 31402-2206



Dear Mr. Trompler:

Enclosed is a copy of a letter dated June 20, 1985, from Aviation Safety and Management Consultants. This letter alleges that several general aviation airplanes including the Piper PA-23-150 and the PA-24-250 do not meet the requirements of CAR 3.553 and CAR 3.444 (c) pertaining to fuel drain provisions.



Please review these allegations and determine how compliance was shown to these regulations for these airplanes. Please provide your comments, including the details on the method of showing compliance. In addition, please provide this office with a copy of the fuel system drawing that defines the installation with regard to draining.


Please expedite action on this matter. The inquiry was made through Senator Packwood and Congressman Robert F. Smith's offices.

Sincerely,

John R. James



Manager, Atlanta Aircraft
Certification Office






Enclosure

Yes hermy, way to anal. Think about that next time you're winging off to Vegas at 25K feet and 500 mph...

Then remember three of those pilots...

who have your life in their hands...

these glorious bastards who risk their lives every day keeping you safe with their anal retentiveness...

These unsung heros of public safety that train for years, at great personal expense...

Three of these pilots would have to pool their paychecks to equal =
one fat, thumbs in his belt, calling for five back up cars for a skateboard ridin, pellet gun wielding chump, Santa Barbara cop's paycheck with his gold plated pension...

Ask them what their retirement plans look like...

Dr. PAUL J. YOCOM
--Physician--
(Doctor of Chiropractic)
(305) 631-9536

-----1802 South Fiske Blvd., Suite #110; Rockledge, Florida; 32955----



2-17-88



Aviation Consumer
1111 East Putnam Ave.,
Riverdale, Conn. 06878



Gentlemen:



RE: Piper Apache Water Hazzard.



On Thursday, January 28th 1988, the F.A.A. in conjunction with Piper aircraft conducted an experiment regarding the water hazzard in the Piper Apache. The aircraft used was 1956 Piper Apache serial no 23-555, which is owned by the undersigned. The F.A.A./Piper team was very cooperative; interested; and thorough. The unofficial results of the experiment by my observation is that each fuel cell (main or aux) definately can hold water that is not able to be drained out. The amount of water remaining appears to be approximately 3 1/2 times the volume of the gascolator, which would guarantee an engine failure due to water contamination. I have had this problem with my aircraft, and frankly until I got the water all out, I became pretty handy at flying the Apache on one engine. I had 3 failures: one on level flight when I switched to aux fuel; one in I.F.R. conditions which included an instrument approach; and one on take off at about 400' A.G.L.. For Apache doubters -- it will fly with the right engine failed (feathered and gear up real quickly) on extended take off (400' AGL) at gross on a 70 degree morning at sea level. It just dosent do it very well, but it does do it. It climbs about 50-75'/min, and directional control is easy with trim, The problem was water. The engine right engine did quit very abruptly and ingested enough water that a restart on the aux tank was not possible when it was tried on the ground. When the gascolator was drained, the engine started and ran normally. The problem is serious, and it happens very abruptly, and unpredicatably. It is not correctable by adding alcohol to the gasoline. The tanks must be opened and the water physically removed. Some also collects in the crossfeed. The carburators and fuel lines must also be drained. Water must be prevented from getting into the tanks. The correction will likely be some method of better protecting the fuel from water (at the very least new fuel caps are a must), and drastically increasing the water separation capabilities of the fuel system. As always in a twin, one must keep current on emergency procedures, and use everything that you know and don't panic in the event of an emergency. The Apache is otherwise a very fine airplane, and it will do what it was designed to do using one's very best piloting skills. Frankly I am alive to tell about it, but I would have "enjoyed" an I.R.S. audit more!


Dr. Paul J. Yocom
Rockledge, FLA.

Aviation Safety and Management Consultants, ASMC, was a business owned and operated by Norman L. Horton, Jerry L. Wells collaborating, in Central Point, Oregon. Mr. Horton has retired and the company is no longer in operation, but during
the company's lifetime, consultants Horton and
Wells spent many years investigating general aviation aircraft accidents. In the course of their work, they discovered problems related to fuel contamination and positive detection of it.
Mr. Wells is still actively investigating aircraft accidents from his office and shop in Auburn, Washington and can be reached at (253) 735-3769.
2004
In June of 2004, Horton and Wells provided documentation of their findings to SumpThis as well as granted permission to SumpThis to distribute their information, which spans the years 1985 through 1996 and reveals ASMC's effort to work with the FAA, the NTSB and general aviation aircraft manufacturers.
ASMC's documentation is available here on the SumpThis web-site at the following link

ASMC's Quest for Positive Detection of Fuel Contamination

http://www.sumpthis.com/hwdocs/docume...