In any attempt to bridge the domains of experience belonging to the spiritual and physical sides of our nature, time occupies the key position.
—Arthur Stanley Eddington, 1928
Everything is determined, the beginning as well as the end, by forces over which we have no control. It is determined for insects as well as for the stars. Human beings, vegetables, or cosmic dust, we all dance to a mysterious tune, intoned in the distance by an invisible piper.
—Albert Einstein
Even very smart people can be wrong. After all, Einstein showed with his theories of relativity that Newton, another very smart guy, didn’t have the whole picture on the nature of space or time. But nor did Einstein, it seems, as I’ll describe. It is becoming increasingly clear that Einstein was wrong about the nature of time and determinism.
What is time? For Einstein and most physicists, time is considered an additional dimension akin to a spatial dimension — sometimes described as “the spatialization of time.” We arrive at a four-dimensional universe in which time is reversible and there is no real difference between past, present, and future. Past, present, and future are all just different coordinates in an unchanging and eternal “block universe.” Einstein made this view explicit in a 1955 letter to a friend; the appearance of past, present, and future as distinct features of our experience, he wrote, is a “stubbornly persistent illusion.”
Sometimes, developments that seem like advances can actually be setbacks. Einstein’s views on time have become prevalent in science and philosophy, but what is far less prevalent is the understanding that in a world where time is an illusion and the universe is deterministic, there is no room for free will.
Free will is an active area of interest in psychology and philosophy. There is an increasing — and disturbing — trend toward a kind of hard-nosed acceptance that we don’t have free will. The attitude is something like: “Science is increasingly showing us that we are not that important. Copernicus showed us that we’re not at the center of the universe, Darwin showed us that we’re just another animal, and physics has shown us that there is nothing special about consciousness and that we suffer from an illusion of free will because past, present, and future all exist at the same time.”
This attitude, while increasingly pervasive, goes too far in my view. Much of it is, of course, correct: We are not at the center of the universe, and we have evolved just as all other creatures have evolved on this blue/green planet of ours. But we are also the leading edge of that creative process, with our highly complex consciousness and associated attributes. Even though many things are indeed beyond our conscious control, it is not the case that we are conscious automatons in a deterministic world. New physical ideas support this view, and we are now seeing the dissemination of these ideas slowly but surely, steadily eroding Einsteinian determinism.
Do you really believe you have no free will? Does a physicist who subscribes to Einstein’s “tenseless” theory of time really believe she has no free will? I believe the answer is “no” in both cases. Even those who deny free will certainly act as though they do have free will. And let’s not forget that our criminal justice system, not to mention our entire system of morality and ethics, rests on the notion that we do have free will.
Doesn’t common sense demand some kind of reconciliation with our innate sense of free will and physical conceptions of time?
Ilya Prigogine (1917-2003), a Belgian physicist and Nobel Prize winner, worked for decades to show why Einstein was wrong about his views on time and determinism. Prigogine states in his 1996 book, The End of Certainty, which summed up his life work on the nature of time: “The spatialization of time is incompatible with both the evolving universe, which we observe around us, and our own human experience.”
Indeed, our own human experience is tensed through and through. All we know with any certainty is the fact of our own experience now, now, now. All we know is the now. The past is remembered, and the future imagined. Only the now is real.
How, then, do we reconcile the obvious facts of our experience with the strange physics of tenseless time, with Einstein’s “block universe” in which past, present, and future are all said to exist concurrently?
It is becoming increasingly apparent that we reconcile these competing views by bowing to common sense and embracing new ideas in the area of physics known as thermodynamics — Prigogine’s life-long area of focus. Prigogine describes at length in his work how thermodynamics demonstrates the necessity of an arrow of time. There is no block universe. Prigogine writes, “Nature itself … distinguishes between past and future. There is an arrow of time.” He also states that we need to reformulate the “laws of physics in accordance with the open, evolving universe in which man lives.” Hear hear.
Prigogine’s work is of the highest rigor and provides at least a partial solution to the problems of time and free will. He shows that classical mechanics and the prevailing versions of quantum mechanics can’t describe much of the universe accurately because they consist of time-reversible equations. Irreversibility must be included in the equations in order to accurately model our universe.
Prigogine concludes: “We see that human creativity and innovation can be understood as the amplification of laws of nature already present in physics or chemistry…. Nature is indeed related to the creation of unpredictable novelty where the possible is richer than the real.”
Why did Einstein believe time was an illusion?
I’m going to get a bit more detailed at this point and explain how Einstein arrived at the notion of the block universe, of tenseless time. It’s based on an assumption that is not necessarily true and that I believe is not true.
Einstein developed his theory of special relativity in 1905 by starting with the idea that “time” can best be defined by using light as a tool for establishing the simultaneity of distant events. He further assumed that the speed of light is constant in all directions, regardless of the speed of the observer. I’ve previously written about how strange this assumption is because nothing else in the universe behaves this way. It has nonetheless become the prevailing view of the nature of light, space, and time.
The problem of establishing simultaneity between distant events was a major inspiration for Einstein’s special theory of relativity. Establishing whether one event is simultaneous with an event elsewhere was a thorny problem in Einstein’s era — and remains so today. In late 19th-century Switzerland (where Einstein lived at the time), the problem of synchronizing the country’s many town clocks became an obsession among physicists, including Einstein, in large part because of the growing network of trains and train schedules.
Einstein proposed in his 1905 paper on special relativity that, rather than making an assertion about whether a given event was “really” simultaneous with other events elsewhere, the problem could be resolved by postulate. Einstein’s postulate was to assume that light travels at a uniform speed at all times for all observers no matter their own speed. Light could be used to synchronize distant clocks under this assumption. With distant synchronized clocks, events occurring at those clocks may be judged as simultaneous or not by noting the readings of the clocks at each location at the time of the events and then adjusting for the speed of light. Einstein wrote in his 1916 popular book on his relativity theories (emphasis in original):
“There is only one demand to be made of the definition of simultaneity, namely, that in every real case it must supply us with an empirical decision as to whether or not the conception that has to be defined is fulfilled. That my definition satisfies this demand is indisputable. That light requires the same time to traverse [paths of equal distance, regardless of motion] is in reality neither a supposition nor a hypothesis about the physical nature of light, but a stipulation [postulate] which I can make of my own free will in order to arrive at a definition of simultaneity.”
In other words, to arrive at a way of determining simultaneity, Einstein stipulated (or postulated) that the speed of light is constant for all observers, regardless of their own motion. So, rather than treat the speed of light like any other speed, which does depend on the speed of the observer, light is to be considered the exception to this otherwise universal rule.
Einstein is certainly correct when he stated that he may stipulate what he wishes, but there is, however, more than one demand to be made of a definition of simultaneity: that it help us arrive at an accurate understanding of nature and not conflict with undeniable aspects of human experience, such as the flow of time and evolution of the universe.
There are other interpretations of relativity that don’t require assuming a constant speed of light for any observer — for example that of Hendrik Lorentz, a Dutch Nobel Prize winner who was a mentor to Einstein. Under Lorentz’s theory, the speed of light acts like any other speed in that it changes with respect to the speed of the observer. Lorentz’s theory explains empirical observations just as Einstein’s theory does because both theories use the same mathematical framework known as the Lorentz transformations. Thus, we need not lose the accuracy of the mathematical formalisms of special relativity even if we reject Einstein’s assumptions.
Another well-known Einstein saying, with respect to Niels Bohr’s “Copenhagen interpretation” of quantum mechanics, is that “God does not play dice with the universe.” Indeed, he does not. But nor is the universe deterministic as Einstein believed. Rather, God has given to his creation the ability to choose, the ability to exert free will, at every level of nature, as I have described in a number of columns. Thus, what is thought of as chance is better described as choice. Choice, not chance. This panpsychist expansion of Prigogine’s work brings us full circle.
Reconciling relativity and quantum theory?
Determinism is a common theme in relativity theory (the physics of the very large scale) and quantum mechanics (the very small scale), which conflict in many ways. Resolving the nature of time, free will, and determinism, may well lead us to a reconciliation of these two pillars of modern physics. This reconciliation remains the biggest challenge in modern physics.
There are more than two choices, however, when it comes to the famous debate between Einstein’s determinism and Bohr’s complementarity and indeterminism. Bohr’s view is that the act of measurement and choosing what to measure has a real role in determining the results of measurement. This has given rise to all manner of suggestions that humans literally create their own physical world around them. This goes too far in my view.
There is a third choice: the view that all aspects of the universe enjoy at least a rudimentary free will. In this view, all entities “measure” themselves through their ongoing and necessary interaction with the universe around them. This conclusion follows from the extension of at least a rudimentary consciousness to all matter.
This position seems very strange to most people encountering it for the first time, but it has support from good sources. The well-known British-American physicist Freeman Dyson, with Princeton’s Institute for Advanced Studies for many years, stated in 1979: “[T]he processes of human consciousness differ only in degree but not in kind from the processes of choice between quantum states which we call ‘chance’ when made by electrons.” David Bohm, a highly influential American physicist, wrote similarly in 1987: “Even the electron is informed with a certain level of mind.”
The rudimentary free will that exists in subatomic particles like electrons compounds upward until it reaches the rarefied heights that we humans enjoy. We are not different in kind from the rest of the universe — in terms of free will or consciousness. We human beings, the result of almost four billion years of evolution, are instead different only in degree. The difference seems to be a difference in kind because the gap is very large. But the spectrum of free will is surely grand, and we happen to enjoy a rarefied position at its most advanced terminus.
Under the views on time that I’ve sketched here, we realize that choice — free will — pervades our universe. Each moment is creative and free for each and every entity in our universe. At lower levels of complexity, habit dominates, and the exercise of free will is quite regular — which is why our statistical laws of mechanics work quite well in most situations (with some key exceptions, as Prigogine describes). But as choice complexifies, outcomes become less certain — as befits a creative and evolving universe.
I’ll end with another Prigogine nugget: “[T]he more we know about our universe, the more difficult it becomes to believe in determinism.”


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This is similar to the argument between Christian theologians with regard to determinism vs. free will. If free will exists, then God can be surprised and is therefore not omniscient. On the other hand, if God is omniscient, then he knows what is going to happen in the future (e.g., who will be saved and who damned). An omniscient God presupposes determinism. Considering the limitations of our perceptual tools, it is unlikely that we will ever be able to understand the true nature of time. We are trapped in it and unable to take a meta view of time from outside of time. It is interesting to ponder though. I wonder, in a universe of free will, is it possible that the laws of gravity will some day be suspended?
Eckermann (anonymous profile)
December 31, 2011 at 3:04 p.m. (Suggest removal)
"Doesn’t common sense demand some kind of reconciliation with our innate sense of free will and physical conceptions of time?"
But I question your assumption that time is a "physical" concept. Why is that time, a concept since antiquity was a part of philosophical and religious inquiry suddenly became a "physical" subject owned by physicists?
Examples: Plato discusses time in Timaeus says time is not an "Idea" but the part of the machinery of the created world. Aristotle also discusses time: "Time is often said to be motion or change, but these are properties of individual things, whereas time is same everywhere." St. Augustine asks "What is time?" and also says "God lives outside of time. His Word has existed since eternity. There was no time before creation." This last sentence could have been uttered today by physicists on the authority of some equation.
zeynel (anonymous profile)
December 31, 2011 at 5:41 p.m. (Suggest removal)
Unfortunately the author fails to note that Bohr's view has now been proven by physics to be correct, so it cannot be dismissed simply by the author's view of things (see: "The Physics of Consciousness" by Walker, or Oxford University's "The Quantum Enigma."). Furthermore, his view is in error. It is not Bohr's and other's view that we "create" the physical world around us, but rather that we can manipulate it in very small ways (see: "Spirit Talkers" by William Lyon). So the second choice is the correct one.
DrBill (anonymous profile)
January 1, 2012 at 10:44 a.m. (Suggest removal)
Eckarmann beat me to the Arminus-Calvin polemic but there is one question I have: Why is light treated as an absolute? In other words if one is on a moving object and shines a flashlight out the front window of the object, why doesn't the light travel at its speed plus the added speed of the object?
billclausen (anonymous profile)
January 1, 2012 at 3:22 p.m. (Suggest removal)
Zeynel and Eckermann, time is indeed a topic of both religious and scientific inquiry. It is a physical concept, necessarily, because physics seeks to explain how the universe works. Time is clearly part of that explanation. So while physical and religious concepts of time are, and always will be, debatable, there is no question that time must be included in any physical or religious narrative/explanations.
For an interesting discussion of how religious concepts affect physics theories, such as the Big Bang, check out Eric Lerner's book The Big Bang Never Happened. He argues that Big Bang cosmology is preferred today partly because it supports in some key ways the Christian creatio ex nihilo story. He prefers the plasma cosmology explanation of our universe's origins.
TamHunt (anonymous profile)
January 1, 2012 at 6:10 p.m. (Suggest removal)
DrBill, Bohr has not been proven correct in his interpretation of quantum mechanics. The debate is very much alive and there is an increasing shift to the many worlds interpretation of QM first proposed by Hugh Everett. See Brian Greene's new book, The Hidden Reality, for a defense of this theory, or David Deutsch's The Fabric of Reality.
Personally, I don't like either Bohr's or Everett's interpretations very much. I prefer the Bohmian interpretation, which is partly inspired by Whitehead's earlier philosophical work (Process and Reality and other works). See Shimon Malin's insightful book, Nature Loves to Hide for an extensive discussion.
TamHunt (anonymous profile)
January 1, 2012 at 6:15 p.m. (Suggest removal)
billclausen, Einstein chose to treat light speed as absolute based primarily on the asymmetry he observed between Newtonian mechanics and Maxwell's equations of electromagnetism. The former recognizes the principle of relativity (not the same as his theory of relativity) insofar as its equations apply equally to any system regardless of its motion. Maxwell's equations on electromagnetism, however, did not recognize the principle of relativity. In other words, Maxwell's equations, required an absolute frame of reference such that the laws result in different answers depending on the motion of the observer. Einstein's theory of special relativity reconciled Maxwell's equations with the principle of relativity. Einstein was surely also influenced by the Michelson-Morley experiments that failed to find any evidence of the frame of reference because they didn't find a difference in the speed of light when measured at different moving speeds (using the Earth as the observational viewpoint).
Lorentz's theory of relativity, however, explains the Michelson-Morley experiments equally well. And in my mind, there is quite a good reason that electromagnetism depends on the frame of reference: there are many lines of reasoning that lead us back to the ether/ground of being/Brahman concept, as I've detailed in previous essays here.
TamHunt (anonymous profile)
January 1, 2012 at 6:31 p.m. (Suggest removal)
Before you apply the term "free will" univocally to every existing entity from quarks to, supposedly, a creator God (whatever you now intend that to mean), you need to engage how this term is defined and elaborated in the tradition from Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas on to Leibniz, Hume, Kant, and beyond, as well as how it relates to more recent psychological- and neurochemical-based discussions of behavior, rather than just mine 20th-century physicists for quotes congenial to your metaphysical preferences.
pk (anonymous profile)
January 2, 2012 at 7:32 a.m. (Suggest removal)
Also, all the fairly recent twin studies (studies involving identical twins raised separately and twins raised together) put a very interesting spin on determinism. It appears as if, in addition to determining our physcal makeup, our DNA determines somewhere between 50% and 75% of who we are psychologically. Now I guess you could say that all those tiny molecules in the womb were making free-will decisions and dismiss all evidence of determinism with such deus ex machina arguments. I'm not saying that genes are destiny, but they certainly do determine baseline conditions and are not subject to free will.
Eckermann (anonymous profile)
January 2, 2012 at 10:38 a.m. (Suggest removal)
I love that this kind of article and dialogue appears in the Santa Barbara Independent--or at least on the website.
jimstoic (anonymous profile)
January 2, 2012 at 10:43 a.m. (Suggest removal)
pk, good to see you back on this forum. First, I didn't suggest that I subscribe to the view of a creator God with free will. I mentioned God in this piece because of the famous Einstein quote about God not playing dice. Of course, Einstein subscribed to the Spinozist view of God as a broad principle (pantheism essentially) and not any theistic notion of God. As I've described in previous essays, I subscribe to a panENtheistic view of God, in which God/Brahman/ground of being is the soil from which our universe springs. This soil is probably not conscious and thus does not have free will. I also suggested that there may in fact be beings at levels of complexity far higher than us that are equally deserving of the name God. And there may in fact be a conscious God that is the sum total of all entities in the universe - and that conscious God would, by my definition of consciousness, have free will.
As I detailed in previous essays, the task of both philosophy and science is to explain how the obvious complexity around us arose from simplicity. In other words, what are the most plausible and comprehensive evolutionary explanations for the complexity we observe, including ourselves and our conscious minds?
As for your suggestion that I need to discuss all previous Western philosophers who have discussed free will in my piece, it's already rather long!
What are your specific objections to the notion that free will is a spectrum that extends from the smallest of entities to the largest?
TamHunt (anonymous profile)
January 2, 2012 at 12:11 p.m. (Suggest removal)
Without your addressing any of the philosophical or theological tradition on "free will," or any of the psychological or biochemical literature bearing on it, it's impossible to know what you mean when you apply this term to "all aspects of the universe."
pk (anonymous profile)
January 2, 2012 at 1:54 p.m. (Suggest removal)
pk, when I suggest that free will is a fundamental aspect to reality, I mean that all actual entities (what I've called simple or complex subjects in my more technical work) have, by dint of being actual entities, free will. All actual entities are conscious, by definition, and, also by definition, being conscious means that the entity enjoys free will.
At its most basic level, an actual entity such as an electron, receives information from the universe around and makes a choice about how to manifest in the next moment based on that information. "How to manifest" means for the electron how to move. So the classic double slit experiment, which yields a wave pattern as each electron passes through either of the two slits and impacts the detector, results not from chance, but from the choice manifested by each electron. So Schrodinger's wave equation predicts very well the ultimate distribution of electrons, but the better interpretation of this equation (and QM more generally) is not that it's simply chance that governs how electrons or other particles behave, but, instead, choice. A very rudimentary choice, indeed when it comes to structures as simple as electrons, but, we infer, choice nonetheless.
With respect to psychological examinations of free will, the discussion gets more complex because complex structures like human beings are comprised of many levels of actual entities. While we can (as actual entities ourselves) exercise free will in each moment in many ways, we are not infinitely free. We are subject to history and thus have a far narrower range to exercise our free will than if we were in some hypothetical unbounded space of pure potential independent of history.
The key point in this Whiteheadian interpretation of free will that I've outlined here is that each actual entity, the sum total of which comprises the entire universe, makes a choice in each moment of the creative advance. This is what "creative" means for Whitehead. The creative advance is the laying down of the universe in each moment and each actual entity takes in information about the universe and makes a choice. So the universe is comprised entirely of choice-making entities in an eternal progression of choices guided, but not determined, by history.
TamHunt (anonymous profile)
January 2, 2012 at 8:37 p.m. (Suggest removal)
You can't simply ignore the rich philosophical and theological tradition and apply a deeply elaborated term like "free will" without addressing what that tradition has done with and about the concept. What aspects of the electron's personhood and mental faculties and the restraints and influences on them factor into it's freely willed choices?
pk (anonymous profile)
January 3, 2012 at 9:22 a.m. (Suggest removal)
I'm not ignoring these traditions, pk. It's a matter of space and time - for writing, that is.
My vision of reality, again heavily influenced by Whitehead, is that what makes something actual (that is, it fully exists) is the process of reception of information and a choice as to how to act on that information. Whitehead calls this prehension and concrescence.
The fact that process occurs even at the lowest levels of actuality is inferred by the behavior of these actualities (as noted by Dyson, etc.) and through the principle of continuity: in biology, in particular, we don't see dramatic new forms or features suddenly appear; instead, they appear incrementally. With consciousness and free will, it is far more parsimonious to suggest that it is present in all actualities and that it compexifies as actualities complexify, rather than that consciousness and free will suddenly appear at some mid-level of complexity due to mysterious and unidentified properties coming into being.
TamHunt (anonymous profile)
January 3, 2012 at 3:41 p.m. (Suggest removal)
Rather than address questions raised by your assertions, you simply restate what your application of the principle of parsimony tells you must be true about the world.
There is a 2500-year history of philosophical and theological thought on free will prior to Whitehead's neologisms -- coinages that neither unfold nor shed light on the issue. This long and rich history has, after all, set the framework for the use of the concept. It isn’t enough to keep proclaiming the supposed metaphysical necessity of an electron’s having free will. If you are going to use that term, you need to make sense of it within the context of the tradition that has spent so much time and effort giving it meaning. For example, I think it's reasonable to ask how we’re supposed to apply notions regarding the internal faculties of personality, and the factors that influence how those faculties are brought into play to weigh alternatives and engage in decision making, as well as explanations that see these faculties and factors as grounded in particular psychological and neurochemical conditions, to an electron such that it becomes legitimate to describe its behavior as the product of "free will."
pk (anonymous profile)
January 3, 2012 at 5:26 p.m. (Suggest removal)
pk, if you have a particular thinker(s) in mind on the topic of free will, why don't you describe the position(s) and I'll address it.
Again, brevity prevents a full consideration of all thinkers. But keep in mind that Whitehead was fully cognizant of the philosophical, theological and physical traditions with respect to free will, determinism and consciousness. His books are replete with discussions of previous thinkers, including Spinoza, Locke, Kant, Hume, Schopenhauer and many others.
TamHunt (anonymous profile)
January 3, 2012 at 5:52 p.m. (Suggest removal)
Tam, I don't have the time or expertise to try to lay out the history of philosophy and theology as it bears on this topic. I realize you've read Whitehead in depth, but the obvious reach of his knowledge doesn't remove the need for someone who wants to discuss these matters to address that tradition directly, including what has been written on this and closely related topics more recently. As I stated in the final sentence of my previous comment, I think it's appropriate to ask someone who claims that electrons have "free will" to explain how the tradition as he understands it bears on that claim.
pk (anonymous profile)
January 4, 2012 at 11:37 a.m. (Suggest removal)
Well, it depends on the tradition you're referring to pk. I've addressed the physics tradition in this essay and comments. I've previously addressed the philosophical tradition of materialism vs. panpsychism, etc., in other columns and comments. With respect to the theological tradition re free will, I think this can fairly be subsumed in my previous philosophical discussions - or dismissed, because I feel pretty comfortable dismissing a priori a conscious creator God as the basis for free will. Now, we could, I guess, expand this notion to the idea of our world as a computer simulation created by a very advanced civilization or being, but that gets so far into speculation I'm not sure there's much use in that.
Last, keep in mind that these are brief essays and there are of course many books that could be written on the topics of time, free will and determinism.
TamHunt (anonymous profile)
January 4, 2012 at 11:56 a.m. (Suggest removal)
Any handbook of philosophy will delineate at least the outlines of the tradition that has led to current concepts of self and free will, which includes writers from Aristotle to Kant and beyond that I don't recall you having addressed in relation to these matters. In particular, it reveals a dismaying paucity of understanding to believe that you can dismiss the deep influence of the work on these subjects by thinkers such as Augustine and Aquinas and the great Protestant Reformers on the grounds that you don't believe in a conscious creator God. You need to undertake a broader reading commitment before attempting the tortuous project of importing the language of selfhood, including in particular that of free will, into subatomic physics.
pk (anonymous profile)
January 4, 2012 at 12:54 p.m. (Suggest removal)
Tam, some books that you might find interesting: Theology and the Scientific Imagination by Amos Funkenstein, God and Reason in the Middle Ages by Edward Grant, The Renaissance Bible: Scholarship, Sacrifice, and Subjectivity by Debora Kuller Shuger, and Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity by Charles Taylor.
pk (anonymous profile)
January 5, 2012 at 7:09 a.m. (Suggest removal)
Give me a break pk. I think one thing at least should stand out in my writings: I'm well-informed and have spent many years studying these issues. You have yet to raise one substantive concern and, instead, simply criticize my essay for being non-comprehensive. As I've mentioned, this is an essay, not a book. I'm happy to engage you on substantive issues, so feel free to raise them.
TamHunt (anonymous profile)
January 5, 2012 at 2:55 p.m. (Suggest removal)
PS. I again urge you to read Whitehead's 1929 book, Process and Reality, for the detail you're seeking. He provides a chapter or two on the detailed process by which he suggests each actual entity forms. I've only provided an outline here so if you want the real substance, plus historical considerations, check out Whitehead. I don't buy Whitehead's system in its entirety and I am working on my own modified Whiteheadian system (two books in progress), that will re-work his "eternal objections" and "primordial nature of God" concepts into a more naturalistic and evolutionary framework.
TamHunt (anonymous profile)
January 5, 2012 at 2:58 p.m. (Suggest removal)
Why do you think that asking the following question within the context of the philosophical tradition on free will, precious little of which you have brought into evidence, but with which you claim to be sufficiently well informed to dismiss the contributions of such as Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, and a pantheon of other great religious thinkers-- is not about substantive issues, and does not deserve an answer other than a stale repetition of your metaphysical premise that electrons must have free will because humans do?
"I think it's reasonable to ask how we’re supposed to apply notions regarding the internal faculties of personality, and the factors that influence how those faculties are brought into play to weigh alternatives and engage in decision making, as well as explanations that see these faculties and factors as grounded in particular psychological and neurochemical conditions, to an electron such that it becomes legitimate to describe its behavior as the product of 'free will.'"
pk (anonymous profile)
January 5, 2012 at 4:01 p.m. (Suggest removal)
Fair enough pk. I was perhaps a bit too quick to dismiss. Let's both agree to do some further background reading and then we can resume when I write part II of this essay on free will...
TamHunt (anonymous profile)
January 6, 2012 at 8:25 a.m. (Suggest removal)
Tam, I have been reading your older articles with great interest and I am starting to see you viewpoint. To my understanding, there is not an absolute connection between our logic (or rather, our tools for understanding) and the universe that we try to understand. You point out paradoxes in our language such as "this sentence is not true". I would like to hear your thoughts on the fact that ALL of our tools for understanding are flawed. We describe the world around us in words that we made up... hence the paradoxes. We also describe the world around us with math. We made up our number system and how to manipulate those numbers.... and we have the paradox of a square root of a negative number. Granted, we learned how to incorporate it into the system, but it makes the system a whole lot more cumbersome.
I would really enjoy reading your thoughts on the math aspect of logic.
RLP (anonymous profile)
January 17, 2012 at 4:11 p.m. (Suggest removal)
RLP, glad you're enjoying my work. I agree that there are some strange paradoxes in mathematics, including the imaginary number i (square root of minus 1). These mathematical tricks work in many situations but why they work is still a mystery. Keep in mind, however, that math is not qualitatively different than other languages. They're all symbolic systems that attempt to map, more or less, on to the real world. Mathematical language is a bit more formal than other languages, but it's not qualitatively different. Godel showed, among other things, how Russell's Barber Paradox translates into mathematical language and the idea is essentially the same whether it's expressed colloquially in the Barber Paradox or mathematically in Godel's complex mathematical language (of course, Godel's formulations are far more general). These issues help me determine my answer to the age-old question: do we discover or invent mathematics? It seems clear to me that we invent mathematics, as we invent all language.
TamHunt (anonymous profile)
January 22, 2012 at 2:41 p.m. (Suggest removal)