On Natural Selection and the Universal Eros
Absent-Minded Science, Part VI
Tuesday, February 22, 2011
I am conscious that I am in an utterly hopeless muddle. I cannot think that the world, as we see it, is the result of chance; and yet I cannot look at each separate thing as the result of Design.~Charles Darwin, 1860 (letter to Asa Gray)
It has now become more or less respectable to talk of purpose or directiveness in ontogeny … but it is still considered heretical to apply the same terms to phylogeny.~Arthur Koestler, 1978 (Janus: A Summing Up)
Since the 1970s, there has been a resurgence of critiques against the mainstream Darwinian theory of evolution, which asserts that “natural selection” is the primary agent of evolution. Criticizing Darwin’s ideas and the “neo-Darwinian” framework that constitutes the modern theory of evolution is not new. What is new, however, is the fact that we seem to be in the middle of a long-overdue shift in what has become an overly dogmatic “adaptationist” view of evolution, in which all or almost all evolution occurs through the posited mechanism of natural selection.
Tam Hunt
This essay continues my extended critique of “absent-minded science,” the tendency in modern science to ignore, intentionally or through oversight, the role of mind in nature. I want to be clear up front that I am not a supporter of “intelligent design” or any religiously-motivated critique of natural selection. Rather, I approach these very difficult problems primarily from the point of view of a hard-nosed philosopher and scientist trying to make sense of it all – and finding that many mainstream approaches could be significantly improved.
Charles Darwin is the father of modern biology, completing his world-changing book, On the Origin of Species, in 1859, after mulling the issues he wrote about for over 25 years. Darwin’s major accomplishment was to present a plausible theory, with oodles of supporting evidence from his observations of pigeons, barnacles, worms, and many other creatures, that explained life’s complexity and evolution as a result not of divine design but of natural design. That is, design without design, without a conscious agent, supernatural or not. Darwin’s theory of evolution was an extended argument that God did not need to be invoked to explain the evolution of life (though Darwin remained agnostic as to whether God needed to be invoked with respect to the origin of life).
Darwin’s vision of evolution resulting from various natural forces, independent of a designer, was actually far more pluralist than today’s mainstream biologists generally acknowledge. Darwin invoked the use and disuse of organs as a major cause in evolutionary change (mole’s eyes have atrophied, for example, because of disuse, as Darwin argued in Origin, though this is not generally an accepted explanation today). He also invoked the process of natural selection as a major cause of evolutionary change—and it has become the all-encompassing explanatory theme for too many modern biologists. Natural selection is analogous to the artificial selection that Darwin observed in pigeons and other domesticated animals of his day. Rather than a conscious agent (humans) selecting desirable traits, however, nature “selects” traits based on their tendency to result in more offspring. “Selects” is in quotes because the key point of natural selection is that it is akin to conscious selection, but it is not in fact conscious. It happens automatically, without any conscious selection.
Today’s mainstream theory of evolution, generally described as “the modern synthesis” or “neo-Darwinism,” combines insights from modern genetics with Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection. As a consequence, much of modern biology is concerned with molecular change in DNA and RNA, which exist in all cells and guide the production of proteins, which are the building blocks for life, independently of larger questions about natural selection.
Whereas Darwin’s vision was “pluralist” because he suggested many agents for evolution, today’s mainstream evolutionary theory is generally “adaptationist” in that it invokes natural selection as either the only significant cause of evolution (adaptation) or, at least, its primary agent. (“Genetic drift” and many other agents are also recognized by mainstream biology but the large majority of biologists still stress natural selection as the key agent). Adaptationists see all, or almost all, traits as the result of natural selection acting on the random evolution of different traits.
Now here’s the major problem with today’s focus on natural selection or adaptationism: Natural selection, as a theory, explains nothing and predicts nothing. This is a strong claim, to be sure, but it can be demonstrated very clearly. The problem arises from the use of different terms for the same concept. A common way of describing natural selection is “survival of the fittest.” This phrase was coined by Herbert Spencer, a British philosopher, but was used by Darwin himself as a synonym for natural selection. Let’s look at the content of this phrase and its meaning.
Survival of the fittest means that the fittest organisms survive and thus spread more offspring. This is how natural selection is supposed to work. But we must ask ourselves what these terms mean. What does “the fittest” mean? Well, to be “fit” in this context means that those organisms that manage to survive leave more offspring. But what does “survival” mean? It means the same thing because there is no evolution without reproduction. So it turns out that the phrase “survival of the fittest” really means “survival of those who survive.”
“Survival of the fittest” is, then, a tautology that means nothing. It has no explanatory power and no predictive power because it is logically empty. It is akin to saying “evolution happens.” While this is obviously true, based on the abundant fossil record showing the development of life on our planet, it does not amount to a theory of how or why evolution happens. And yet the theory of natural selection purports to be exactly that.
This is not a new critique of natural selection. In fact, Samuel Butler, a well-known critic of Darwin who had an ongoing feud with Darwin while both were alive, made this claim. Many others have made the same argument since, including prominent biologists T.H. Morgan, C.H.Waddington, and prominent philosopher of science Karl Popper (though he later recanted without adequately explaining why). The response to this claim has varied over the years but a common one has been something like this: “Even if survival of the fittest is a tautology there are other ways to describe natural selection that aren’t tautological.” This turns out to be an inadequate response because any way the theory of natural selection is described it remains tautological. Here are a few other examples.
Natural selection is often described as “differential reproduction” of those organisms that have more adaptive traits. This just means some organisms leave more offspring than others (“differential”). But what leads to differential reproduction? Survival of the fittest. And I’ve just shown that this phrase is tautological. We can state as an empirical fact that some organisms have more offspring than others, but we are left with no additional information or insight if we assert something like: “Differential reproduction or survival of the fittest was responsible for more offspring.” This statement is yet another tautology.
Another way of describing natural selection is by discussing “adaptive traits.” A trait is adaptive if it leads to more offspring. But this is also tautological because the only way we have to determine what is adaptive is to examine an organism’s reproductive success. How else could we know what is adaptive? To say that a trait is adaptive and thus leads to more offspring is to say that a trait that leads to more offspring is a trait that leads to more offspring. We are back to tautology.
What’s going on here? As I mentioned above, what’s going on is the use of different terms for the same concept. All these terms—survival, fitness, adaptation, differential reproduction—are referring to exactly the same concept: increased offspring. Thus, to say that natural selection is adaptation through survival of the fittest sounds like it means something, but all this phrase really says is that increased offspring are increased offspring are increased offspring. And while saying that “a rose is a rose is a rose” has some poetic meaning, in biology it means nothing. (All of these statements I’ve been discussing can be described as A = A, which is surely true but contains no information).
To those readers who think I’m inaccurate or being unfair, let’s look at an actual statement by a leading current evolutionary thinker. Francisco Ayala, a well-known biologist at UC Irvine, wrote in the 2008 book Back to Darwin: “Natural selection – i.e. differential multiplication – can accomplish adaptation because a favorable mutation that has occurred in one individual may thus spread to the whole species in a few generations…” Let’s parse this sentence. “Natural selection,” “differential multiplication,” “favorable,” “adaptation,” “may thus spread,” are all ways of saying exactly the same thing: More offspring are produced in some situations. Even more simply, all these phrases say, essentially: There is some biological change occurring. Ayala’s sentence says A = A = A = A = A. It is, thus, true but unhelpful as a theory of evolution.
Natural selection is, in the final analysis, simply a postulate and not a theory. It is the postulate that evolution has happened naturally, without supernatural influence. “Natural selection” stands as the counter to the long-held view of “supernatural selection,” that is, the various theories of creationism or intelligent design. To be a theory of evolution, however, the theory must say something about how and why historical changes occurred and make meaningful predictions about what kind of changes we may see in the future. And natural selection, a logically empty theory, is clearly not that theory.
What are we to do?
Jerry Fodor and Massimo Piatelli-Palmarini present a critique of natural selection in their 2010 book, What Darwin Got Wrong. They also argue that natural selection is empty as a theory, though their arguments are a bit different than what I’ve presented above. They suggest that the solution to this impasse is an acknowledgement that natural selection should be considered, instead, “natural history.” And natural history, like all historical writing and thinking, is “just one damned thing after another.” There is some truth to this statement and it is, in fact, largely what many evolutionary biologists do today anyway. In other words, rather than looking to a general theory of how evolution occurs – what natural selection claims to be – biologist and others should (and generally do) focus on describing the actual details of how change seems to have occurred with each species, given the species’ environment, traits, and observed behaviors.
There are other options available, however, including a set of concepts developed by D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson, a 20th Century British biologist, and Stuart Kauffman, a contemporary American biologist, that focus on “order for free” in nature as a whole. Rather than looking to natural selection as the key agent of change in evolution, these thinkers see order arising spontaneously in all sorts of places around us, such as in snowflakes, crystals, and in extremely complex organisms like ourselves and many other creatures, as a compounding of these more basic sources of order.
Another, more controversial, notion is that there is a driving force behind complexity and evolution. This idea has been championed by various biologists, philosophers, and theologians over the centuries. French biologist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck was one of the early and most prominent thinkers who suggested that evolution was being pushed by a “force that perpetually tends to make order.” This was one of two agents of evolution that Lamarck proposed.
The second is more well-known and considered discredited today: The notion that organisms themselves, through intention, use, and disuse, can change their bodies and that some of these changes are inherited. As I mentioned in Part V of this series, however, there is an increasing body of evidence that some evolutionary change is Lamarckian (Ted Steele’s books have argued for reacceptance of Lamarckian inheritance of acquired traits).
The final concept I’ll mention, which is perhaps the best way of framing a comprehensive theory of evolution, was described well by the American philosopher Gerald Heard. Heard wrote in his classic 1939 essay, Pain, Sex and Time, that “from the most primitive forms of life up to the completion of man’s physique, the one clear coordinating achievement is heightened awareness.” Modern biologists know that there is no necessary progression from lower complexity and awareness to higher complexity and awareness. We have many examples of organisms becoming less complex as they evolve. However, it is undeniable that there is a general trend, as Heard describes, toward greater complexity and greater awareness (perception).
Recognizing that this trend exists we can propose as a working hypothesis that there is a driving agent behind this trend. This driving agent may reduce to the same “order for free” tendency that Thompson and Kauffman focus on. But Heard suggests, and I agree, that there is more going on here than the simple physical and chemical ordering principles that Thompson and Kauffman focus on. Rather, there seems to be a basic force in all things that leads to greater connection, thus greater complexity, and thus greater awareness of our universe around us.
These concepts can be framed in a highly rigorous and empirical way and, in fact, Alfred North Whitehead and his co-thinkers have done exactly this. Whitehead, a British mathematician, physicist, and philosopher who ended his long career at Harvard, as professor of philosophy from 1924 to 1937, described in his later works how the eros of the universe was responsible for creativity and evolution. Whitehead’s ideas rest on the notion that all matter, literally, has some degree of consciousness, of awareness. This view is known as panpsychism or panexperientialism and is an increasingly popular solution to the broad inquiry over the last few decades into the nature of consciousness (Parts I through IV of this series discuss panpsychism in some detail).
It turns out that panpsychism offers not only a powerful solution to the question “What is consciousness?” but also to the question, “How did life arise and evolve?”
The panpsychist solution is to recognize that mind and thus purpose are inherent in all of nature – but extremely rudimentary in most cases. However, as matter complexifies in macromolecules like amino acids (which form spontaneously in many situations), this innate mind and purpose starts to play an increasingly significant role in evolution. It is, thus, a bootstrapping process that has no end in sight.
Margulis and Sagan, two respected but admittedly non-mainstream contemporary biologists, support this view in their highly readable 1995 book, What is Life? They appeal to Samuel Butler, an early critic of absent-minded science in biology (p. 232):
“Butler brought consciousness back in [to biology] by claiming that, together, so much free will, so much behavior becoming habit, so much engagement of matter in the processes of life, had shaped life, over eons producing visible organisms, including the colonies of cells called human. Power and sentience propagate as organisms. Butler’s god is imperfect, dispersed. We find Butler’s view - which rejects any single, universal architect - appealing. Life is too shoddy a production, both physically and morally, to have been designed by a flawless Master. And yet life is more impressive and less predictable than any ‘thing’ whose nature can be accounted for solely by ‘forces’ acting deterministically.”
In evolution, then, God is indeed in the details – literally. The “dispersed” God that Margulis and Sagan refer to is the mind contained in each thing, in each organism, that exercises some degree of choice – no matter how small – in how it manifests. This is the “generalizedf sexual selection” I described in Part V, which is an elaboration of Darwin’s own ideas on sexual selection. In GSS, all things have male and female aspects and choices made primarily by females have played a strong role in the evolution of life on our planet. Perhaps the starring role. When we combine Thompson and Kauffman’s “order for free” with the panpsychist “generalized sexual selection,” we may arrive at a universal theory of evolution that provides a comprehensive replacement for the logically empty theory of natural selection.
To sum up this series of essays to this point: We cannot adequately explain matter in physics or evolution in biology without re-naturalizing mind. We needn’t appeal to an archaic notion of God as omniscient designer to provide adequate explanations. Rather, we can appeal to the dispersed god of panpsychism, the god manifested in a million million little pushes from each entity making its own choices (though we shall have a role for a non-dispersed God later in this series of essays).
Mind is inextricably part of nature and if we are to explain this undeniable fact we can no longer ignore mind in our scientific explanations.
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Tam Hunt is a philosopher, lawyer and biologist who was lucky enough to land in Santa Barbara and stay.
Comments
How does the theory that the smallest units of existence are conscious agents whose moment-to-moment choices led to the life we see around us say something scientifically testable "about how and why historical changes occurred and make meaningful predictions about what kind of changes we may see in the future"?
Can you provide a testable explanation in terms of specific genes, organisms, species, and populations?
pk (anonymous profile)
February 23, 2011 at 10:40 a.m. (Suggest removal)
pk, I'm working out these ideas now in a longer paper. There are a number of ways in which Generalized Sexual Selection offers advantages over NS, particularly in its adaptationist form, including:
- GSS is not tautological; a tautology is not a theory so NS fails from the outset
- GSS can explain the sources of variation that are the feedstock for NS by appealing to the striving for survival and/or mating success leading to new traits, in addition to random variation of traits; whereas NS appeals only to random variation of traits (which has always been a difficulty for NS, as explained in Kirschner and Gerhart's recent book The Plausibility of Life)
- GSS can go further in explaining convergent evolution (marsupial wolves vs. non-marsupial wolves, for example, having extremely similar morphology despite a very different phylogenetic history) by appealing to similar intentional solutions being arrived at by individual organisms facing similar problems; whereas NS simply appeals to the incredible view that similar random variations occurred in each instance of convergent evolution (out of an infinite number of possible random variations) and were selected by the environment
I'm continuing to flesh out these ideas and will propose some testable hypotheses in my paper. Testability is very important. Having a coherent explanatory framework is also extremely important. Falsifiability I think will be a problem for both NS and GSS. I can't think of any experiments that would falsify NS and nor can I for GSS because they are both more akin to meta-theories than theories such as those in physics that can be tested and falsified far more readily.
Your feedback is appreciated.
And let me flip the question around: what kind of experiments would you suggest for NS re "how and why historical changes occurred" and "meaningful predictions"?
TamHunt (anonymous profile)
February 24, 2011 at 10:05 a.m. (Suggest removal)
Can you give examples of how an organism's "striving" or "intent" leads to a superior heritable response to a challenge faced by itself and its more poorly responsive conspecifics? In particular, how do the results of these intentional strivings and intentions get encoded at the genomic level among some but not all members of the species?
When challenged, do some bacteria "strive" and exhibit an "intent" to become resistant to antibiotics by creating the resistance genes that other members of the species can't create?
pk (anonymous profile)
February 24, 2011 at 4:16 p.m. (Suggest removal)
pk, the most clear-cut examples of GSS/Lamarckian inheritance today involves the immune system. See Steele, et al.'s book, Lamarck's Signature, for an extended argument that retrogenes (proteins impact germ lines) are the rule in the immune system.
More generally, a very interesting recent example of Lamarckian inheritance involves the green sea slug, which can incorporate algae genes into its soma, live off sunlight alone, and pass this ability on to its offspring:
latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-sci-sea-slugs16-2010jan16,0,861315.story.
Obviously this can be explained without any appeal to the slug's striving, but so can any behavior if we prefer a purely mechanistic explanation. I'm not suggesting that the slug has any high-level awareness of what it is doing, but it is certainly striving to eat the algae, with all the consequences thereof ensuing.
More generally, Laura Landweber at Princeton continues to study Lamarckian paths of inheritance in ciliates and other creatures. Experiments have established that ciliates often display Lamarckian inheritance.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/artic...
Last, Leo Buss's very interesting book, The Evolution of Individuality, takes a rigorous look at all animal phyla and catalogs which ones demonstrate Lamarckian inheritance and which don't. He also paints a fascinating picture of levels of selection in which cellular selection can lead to conflicts with organismic selection (such as cancer).
http://www.amazon.com/Evolution-Indiv...
I'll continue to noodle ways in which individual striving can be tested as a distinct mechanism for the generation of variation, as opposed to random variation in genomes and traits.
TamHunt (anonymous profile)
February 24, 2011 at 7:16 p.m. (Suggest removal)
And here's a link to a story on Landweber's work on Lamarckian inheritance:
http://www.science20.com/news_release...
TamHunt (anonymous profile)
February 24, 2011 at 7:22 p.m. (Suggest removal)
Let's get to the level where this stuff happens: DNA and proteins. How does bacterial "striving" to avoid the effects of an antibiotic work? Where does the protein that counteracts the antibiotic come from in some but not all of the challenged bacteria in a given sample?
pk (anonymous profile)
February 25, 2011 at 7:37 a.m. (Suggest removal)
pk, I see the role of intent (striving) in evolution as a continuum (as with consciousness in the broader theory of panpsychism). As organisms become more complex, they become more active in their own evolution, reaching the high point of human cultural and technological evolution now dramatically increasing the historical pace of evolution in our species. Apparently human evolution now is about 10,000 times what it was in prehistory.
So, looking at bacteria responding to an antibiotic, we can view the bacterium as a unitary subject attempting to "make a living" through feeding, reproduction, locomotion, etc. Its very low-level intent and very rudimentary intelligence allows it to change its behavior in response to its environment. Even though bacteria are obviously extremely simple creatures they demonstrate very complex behavior in some situations, even hunting cooperatively at times! In responding to antibiotics, however, I think that any role of bacterial intention in creating a biochemical organismic response (as opposed to a behavioral response) is probably negligible.
Rather, the random variation (through various endogenous factors) that NS relies on as its feedstock is probably by far the most important factor. It is possible (though much more work will have to be done to establish this) that the psychobiological expression of genes that has been observed in humans (see Rossi's The Psychobiology of Gene Expression) may play a role even at the level of bacteria. If this is accurate, bacterial reactions to their environment - akin to a human responding with an "eek!" - may prompt a change in genetic expression that produces a counter to the antibiotic. But this is admittedly highly speculative at this point in our knowledge.
Even though GSS and NS generally tell the same story with respect to random variation at this biological level (ignoring psychobiological genetic change), the story about "selection" is very different. And this is becaus NS is tautological and thus not explanatory at all. There is no non-tautological "selection." GSS would, however, at this level of biological complexity, reduce to "natural history" in terms of telling the story about each population or species and its response to the antibiotic.
There may also be a way in which Thompson's and Kaufmann's "order for free" plays a key role in variation at this level of biological complexity. And we may be able to frame this order for free within GSS as the observed patterns of intention by each simple subject and populations of simple subjects. I have not, however, thought through these ideas adequately.
Last, google "reverse transcription" and "retrogenes" for more on the biochemical pathways for somatic changes being incorporated into germlines.
TamHunt (anonymous profile)
February 28, 2011 at 11:55 a.m. (Suggest removal)
1. How does one distinguish between a “biochemical organismic” response and a “behavioral” response in a bacterium?
2. If a bacterium lacks a key protein(s) because it lacks the gene(s) whose expression leads to that protein, then no level of “intent,” “striving,” or “intelligence” will allow it to change its behavior or “genetic expression” to defeat the effects of the antibiotic. So the question remains, how does the “random” occurrence of that gene in a fortunate bacterium but not its congeners square with the claim that development thoroughout the chain of life depends at bottom on consciousness and intent inherent in all matter/energy? What does it mean for an event driven by consciousness and intent to be considered “random”?
3. What is your theory’s nontautological story about the selection of the surviving bacteria that improves on NS?
Nothing I see in the literature on retrogenes leads to add anything more than additional layers of distant speculation to these issues.
pk (anonymous profile)
March 1, 2011 at 8:58 a.m. (Suggest removal)
pk, in turn:
1) A behavioral response is just as it sounds: action, movement, of the organism as a whole. By "biochemical organismic response" I meant, to the contrary, an internal change to the organism that is genetic, epigenetic or purely somatic.
2) As I mentioned in my last response: I acknowledge that GSS and NS probably reduce to the same approach when it comes to random genetic/epigenetic variation in this context. That is, the new bacterial protein to combat the antibiotic, if not already encoded for in an existing gene/epigene, will most likely be the result of a random variation. Or what at least appears to be random (see below).
3) As I also mentioned in my last comment, GSS will generally reduce to natural history (not natural selection) in this context, if we exclude any possible psychobiological impact on gene expression under different environmental stimuli. In other words, each organism/population/species would have to be examined for its biochemical response to a new antibiotic and the pathways, stimuli, behavior, etc., mapped out in a detailed description. This narrative is what I mean by natural history. GSS only leads to narratives/explanations that amount to more than natural history in contexts where intention plays a role.
It is crucial, however, to be clear on the biological level at which we seek our explanation. Leo Buss has developed a theory of levels of selection (within the framework of NS) that is surprisingly little discussed, as far as I can tell, among other evolutionary biologists despite the fact that he is a professor at Yale and has written a book on this topic (The Evoution of Individuality). If we are focused on the individual bacterium as the unit of selection, what I wrote above holds true. However, if we extend Buss's idea of levels of selection below the cellular level, the "general" part of GSS may be demonstrated. That is, we may even consider GSS to be operative at the level of individual nucleotides or epigenetic equivalents thereof, or at the individual molecular or atomic level.
TamHunt (anonymous profile)
March 1, 2011 at 11:15 p.m. (Suggest removal)
cont.
Dawkins urged us in the 1970s to look at evolution as the product of selfish genes rather than organisms. Buss urges us to think more broadly and see the various levels of selection (genes, cell lineages, organisms) as complementary. (I'll ignore for the moment the tautology problem of "selection" in Buss' theorizing). GSS urges an even broader framework in which any level that we choose to focus on has its own story to tell, in which male and female aspects of whatever unit we are focused on play a role (recall that male means it provides information and female means it receives information in m terminology). We can, in your example, look at the molecules comprising the genes/epigenes and craft a story about their behavior as generalized sexual selection.
But does extending GSS to this level add anything to our current understanding? I can't say at this point as I'm still developing these ideas. A clear advantage, however, is having a single general theory that can handle whatever level of reality we choose to focus on, with the same principles operative throughout. Nevertheless, it may be the case that traditional approaches to evolution remain more fruitful approaches, even if conceptually flawed - or perhaps GSS and NS may be able to provide complementary stories and thereby enhance each other time.
TamHunt (anonymous profile)
March 1, 2011 at 11:16 p.m. (Suggest removal)
Still not clear about the meaning of "random" in your system. Is the replacement of a nucleotide during DNA replication that leads to a gene for a protein that might prove useless (and therefore energetically costly) or useful (under a future environmental challenge) random? You suggested it might not be, but I didn't see further elaboration. If all entities, even photons and electrons, are conscious and act with intent, what is a "random" event?
pk (anonymous profile)
March 2, 2011 at 7:32 a.m. (Suggest removal)
At the deepest level of explanation, GSS (and panpsychism) assert that nothing is random. All events are, rather, the result of choice by simple or complex subjects (actual entities in Whitehead's terminology). However, this doesn't change the mathematical analysis of, for example, statistical mechanics or thermodynamics. As Dyson and Bohm have suggested, even the electron's behavior should be viewed as choice rather than randomness. But it will appear random b/c choices are either completely indeterminate or we simply don't know enough about rudimentary choice to make predictions beyond statistical predictions that are already the basis of quantum mechanics.
GSS will lead to meaningful predictions (in theory) only at higher levels of organization/selection/mentality - probably at the level of unicellular creatures and higher. I'm still fleshing out the testable framework of GSS so stay tuned.
In terms of nucleotide replacement, we could if pressed explain such changes as the product of choice by each molecule comprising the nucleotide and surrounding structure (it doesn't seem to me that there would be any holonic entity at the nucleotide level itself but I can't rule this out), but this probably wouldn't lead to any insight beyond the current view that such changes are random - or at least may be modeled as random.
TamHunt (anonymous profile)
March 3, 2011 at 11:56 a.m. (Suggest removal)
No only won't replacing "random genetic mutation" with "unknowable-to-us conscious choices by macromolecules" add any explanatory insight, I'm not sure that considering bacteria as conscious agents will do much either, unless you can give them a psychology to go along with their psyches so you can explain why they do what they do. Otherwise they might as well be considered mind-free stimulus/response devices.
pk (anonymous profile)
March 3, 2011 at 4:08 p.m. (Suggest removal)
pk, we already know that bacteria are not stimulus/response devices, based on observed complex and unpredictable behaviors. And we know the same about electrons, as Dyson and Bohm have pointed out. There is certainly a good debate to be had about any methodological changes required under GSS at this low level of biological complexity (compared to current methods); but regardless of methodological changes in limited contexts, the unity of my approach has many merits. By placing matter, mind and "life" all on the same continuum of complexity, subject to the same rules, we gain a huge advance in philosophical and epistemological consistency. The aim of science is to unify where such unification is warranted. So my approach attempts to unify a lot of disparate areas of science and philosophy in a way that provides new insights and simplified approaches in many different areas.
TamHunt (anonymous profile)
March 4, 2011 at 2:32 p.m. (Suggest removal)
The fact that two physicists have made suggestions doesn't mean that we can speak of those suggestions as something we know to be true.
Turbulent fluid flow is also complex and unpredictable. To my knowledge, no one has approached this problem in terms of mental behavior. If bacteria and electrons appear to act in complex and unpredictable ways, it's quite a stretch to take this as evidence that they have minds and have made conscious choices, unless you start with the axiom that any time a course of events occurs that could have occurred otherwise, this signifies that a "choice" has been made by a conscious agent.
So the issue is whether this axiomatic anthropomorphization leads to a unifying simplification or merely extends notions of interiority and selfhood to what seem like absurd lengths without offering a single new verifiable insight into the "behavior" of bacteria, electrons, quarks, leptons, or anything else. Clearly you remain hopeful that it will.
pk (anonymous profile)
March 4, 2011 at 7:01 p.m. (Suggest removal)
I certainly agree that Dyson and Bohm are not the arbiters of truth - but at the same time the fact that they support my interpretation (or vice versa) is important because of the depth of their thinking on physics and philosophy.
I also agree with you that a phenomenon displaying complexity and unpredictability is not necessarily evidence of conscious choices. However, many other lines of reasoning support my assertions with respect to the units of nature being experiential, as I have fleshed out in these essays.
My position is not axiomatic anthropomorphization, it is reasoned psychomorphism. We are, as the first and last problem of philosophy, left pondering the relationship between our own experience and everything else ostensibly separate from our center of experience. The only matter we know, literally, is experiential: ourselves. We assume that most other other matter is non-experiential because it doesn't behave or look much like us.
But the better assumption is that other matter is also experiential because we realize that the most parsimonious and the most reasonable explanation of the relationship between our experiencing selves and everything else is one of ontological identity: it's all experience, interacting in constant flux. Each locus of the universe is itself an experiential center, in most cases maximally simple, but in many cases complexifying. And in some rare cases like our blue-green earth, complexifying to wonderful heights of self-awareness and creativity.
TamHunt (anonymous profile)
March 6, 2011 at 8:59 p.m. (Suggest removal)
Seems to me that your are confused about the nature of definitions. Statements like "Natural selection = differential reproduction" define the terms. Yes, they're tautologies. So is the statement "red is a form of light with wavelength 400–484 THz." The measurement is concrete enough, by why is red 400-484 THz, not 400-500? Well, because 484 to 500 are orange and orange isn't red. Why not? And so forth. Circular, you might say, or even content free, but that wouldn't be saying anything useful. Definitions are tautologies that teach us about words and ideas so we can use them well.
The idea of natural selection, defined, helps a person ask questions that help us understand the world around us. It explains the standard by which to measure the success or failure of genes and organisms. It helps us frame questions about why animals and plants, etc., are the way they are. Those questions, and their answers, involve very non-tautological matters of color, size, bone lengths or strengths, hairiness, and the million other traits of organisms, and how those variations help or hinder the organisms, in terms of their survival and reproduction, and the reproduction of their close relatives.
True, natural selection isn't the only process by which organisms change -- the diverse processes we lump together as "genetic drift" can produce effects we humans can consider wonderfully creative. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of the process we define as natural selection is wonderful. We have no need to look around for vague forces for complexity inherent in all matter.
By the way, as a botanist, I find the idea that evolution leads inexorably to increases in perception . . . laughable.
Barbara4 (anonymous profile)
March 11, 2011 at 12:46 p.m. (Suggest removal)
Barbara, your arguments against tautology are commonly offered in support of natural selection as a productive theory. Indeed, there is something that is undeniably tautological about all natural theories and laws. Force equals mass times acceleration, for example, is indeed tautological.
But - and this is a big but - there's a key difference between mathematical laws true by definition, and thus tautological, and theories like natural selection. Saying that force equals mass times acceleration is helpful as a theory because we can use it mathematically to learn the value of one variable when we know the other two. And we can test it. Not so with natural selection. If we state that "natural selection equals differential reproduction" and attempt to use this in the same manner as F=MA the difficulty becomes immediately apparent. There is nothing learned mathematically by saying that natural selection equals differential reproduction b/c these two phrases are saying exactly the same thing with no sub-components to tease apart and test.
If we expand the idea of natural selection to "natural history," as Fodor and Piatelli-Palmerini urge us to in their book, we can gain some insight into how particular populations and species have evolved, but this is generally "just so" ex post speculation - as Gould warned us about in his seminal 1979 Spandrels paper warning us of dogmatic adaptationism. Actually testing differential reproduction in real populations has very rarely been tried and even more rarely resulted in support for a particular hypothesis. And this is unsurprising because we know so little about the infinite number of variables that could affect the fitness of any given population or species.
So, again, natural selection as a theory tells us literally nothing about evolution in itself. It is simply an assumption that whatever forces do lead to evolution are natural and not supernatural. And that's it. It is the natural history, the collecting of facts, about particular populations and species that sheds insight on evolution in these situations.
As for plants and increases in perception, I urge you to think a bit more deeply. It is quite clear that the evolution of plants from non-plant precursors has entailed an increase in perception. Certainly not every species has displayed this trend, as I mention in my essay, but the general trend is undeniably true: life on our planet has achieved a greater and greater ability to collect information from its environment and to act on that information. This is what I mean by "perception," not necessarily senses like sight and hearing.
TamHunt (anonymous profile)
March 13, 2011 at 10:28 p.m. (Suggest removal)
This a bit too much for me..I think I will go shopping!
qmagoo (anonymous profile)
April 5, 2011 at 1:18 p.m. (Suggest removal)
TamHunt, amino acids are *small molecules*, not macro ones.
They organize themselves into macromolecules called proteins. An elementary fact that students learn in high schools.
That major error demonstrates the level of scientific knowledge that you're operating with. Why should anyone take your theories seriously, when you're ignorant of such basic facts?
Garnetstar (anonymous profile)
May 3, 2011 at 8:31 a.m. (Suggest removal)
Garnetstar, you're right: amino acids aren't macromolecules. "Major mistake"? Hardly. It's a very minor terminology mistake. As for my key points, I look forward to your substantive critique and I'll be happy to address any points you raise.
TamHunt (anonymous profile)
May 12, 2011 at 10:09 a.m. (Suggest removal)